SMT2 formal verification of security-critical code paths
CVE-2026-33354 class: requester-controlled chunk file paths must be canonicalized and confined to trusted temporary directories before upload pipeline reuse. This catches sibling arbitrary-local-file-read variants where path checks exist but broad allowlists (webroot/app dirs/videos) still permit attacker-selected local files.
; benchmark generated from python API
(set-info :status unknown)
(declare-fun chunkfile_tempdir_confined () Int)
(assert
(<= chunkfile_tempdir_confined 1))
(assert
(>= chunkfile_tempdir_confined 1))
(assert
(and (distinct chunkfile_tempdir_confined 1) true))
(check-sat)
CVE-2026-33647 class: web-accessible uploads must derive stored filename extensions from a server-side MIME allowlist mapping, never from attacker-controlled original names. This catches sibling polyglot upload variants where MIME sniffing exists but filename extension still controls executable serving behavior.
; benchmark generated from python API
(set-info :status unknown)
(declare-fun upload_extension_bound_to_validated_mime () Int)
(assert
(<= upload_extension_bound_to_validated_mime 1))
(assert
(>= upload_extension_bound_to_validated_mime 1))
(assert
(and (distinct upload_extension_bound_to_validated_mime 1) true))
(check-sat)